In the summer of 1998, the Wisconsin State legislature amended its child protection laws. Under new child abuse provisions, Wisconsin judges can confine pregnant women who abuse alcohol or drugs for the duration of their pregnancies. South Dakota enacted similar legislation almost simultaneously. The South Dakota statute requires mandatory drug and alcohol treatment for pregnant women who abuse those substances and classifies such activity as child abuse. In addition, the South Dakota legislation gives relatives the power to commit pregnant women (...) involuntarily for two days; a court order can place the pregnant women in custody for up to nine months. These recent legislative “successes” follow scores of failed attempts by legislators in other states to establish fetal protection laws aimed at women who use and abuse drugs and alcohol during pregnancy. (shrink)

On March 9, 1993, in the first ruling of its kind, the Maryland Court of Appeals declared that physicians and hospitals may be sued for failing to inform patients of a practitioner’s human immunodeficiency virus status. What is more significant, these suits may be pursued even in instances when the physician has followed universal precautions and the patient did not contract the virus that causes acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. The Maryland court addressed two central questions in Faya v. Almaraz. First, do (...) HIV-infected physicians have a legal duty to inform their patients of their HIV status? And, second, can patients recover damages for fear induced by a physician’s conduct? While one finds numerous precedents that authorize actions to recover damages based purely on fear of disease and emotional distress, the Faya court’s holdings on the issue significantly expand the scope of potential liability. Moreover, the court’s analysis of the informed consent and HIV-infected physician issue is incomplete, inconsistent, and represents an unjustified and unwise departure from traditional informed consent theory. It, and its progeny, may have widespread and dire repercussions. (shrink)

The growing phenomenon of teenage pregnancy introduces the problem of who should serve as surrogate decision makers for the children of adolescent parents. The justifications which sanction society's grant of presumptive decision making authority for adult parents, and the rationales and empirical evidence supporting a central role for adolescents who wish to make medical decisions regarding their own care, together suggest that older adolescent parents should be viewed as the presumptive decision makers for their children. There is, however, empirical evidence (...) that adolescent parents lack the cognitive abilities of childless adolescents of the same age and that many exhibit lower levels of emotional stability, sensitivity to infant needs, and social adjustment. These deficiencies, where present, undermine the very justifications for allowing adolescents to make medical decisions for their children. These findings are strong enough to justify a greater level of watchfulness over the competency and decisions of those adolescents who wish to make decisions for their children, but not definitive enough to conclude that, as a group, they be presumed incapable of making those decisions. (shrink)

The dramatic appearance of managed care organizations (MCOs) on the U.S. health scene has generated tremendous anxiety among health care providers and patients. These fears are based on the belief that managed care techniques pose greater risks of under treatment than do fee-for-service modes of payment. In addition, many physicians and patients resent the limits placed on clinical autonomy by the MCO model and the stresses that it places on the traditional physician-patient relationship. These misgivings have been exacerbated by the (...) mostly negative response to MCOs in the media and academia. Legislatures have responded to these claims and public fears with a wave of regulatory initiatives. Some of these regulations are attempts to protect patients. Others, however, are motivated primarily by antipathy toward the concept of managed care itself. This essay is an attempt to develop a social ethic of regulation and argues that the sole reason that private enterprise may be justifiably limited is when it presents a risk of harm to others or society. While some regulation and proposed regulation of MCOs meet this standard, much legislation represents an unjustified attempt to limit or handicap otherwise legal behavior merely because a segment of the population and medical profession find it aesthetically unpleasing and oppose its approach to the delivery of health services. (shrink)

This essay examines the so-called phenomenon of defensive medicine and the problematic aspects of attempting to maintain the safest legal position possible. While physicians face genuine litigation threats they frequently overestimate legal peril. Many defensive practices are benign, but others alter patient care and increase costs in ways that are ethically suspect. Physicians should learn to evaluate realistically the legal risks of their profession and weigh the emotional, physical, and financial costs to the patient before employing a defensive measure.

According to a 2001 market report, titled “The Cure Is in Hand,” handheld computers, or personal digital assistants, will “dramatically change the way that physicians practice medicine.” Such enthusiasm has resulted in an extraordinarily rapid diffusion of PDAs into a wide range of clinical settings. One report states that 47% of internists use PDAs once a day with rates of daily usage reaching 70% for resident physicians. Another study found clinical usage as high as 85% in teaching hospitals. The rapidly (...) expanding employment of PDAs, however, has been uneven. Some clinicians have explored the devices’ benefits more thoroughly than their colleagues. Similarly, a number of potentially valuable uses of the handheld computer have been ignored or remain insufficiently developed by the medical community and the health delivery system at large. (shrink)